The Allahabad High Court has ruled that trial courts cannot direct investigating agencies like the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) to secure sanction for the prosecution of public servants. According to the court, such a direction would essentially amount to ordering the competent authority to grant sanction, which is impermissible under the law.
Justice Raj Beer Singh made this observation while allowing a petition filed by former Saharanpur District Magistrate Pawan Kumar, who challenged an order by the special judge at Ghaziabad. The special judge had refused to accept a CBI closure report and directed the agency to obtain prosecution sanction against Kumar in connection with the alleged illegal renewal of sand mining leases.
The high court set aside the special judge’s order as it pertained to Kumar, who is currently posted as director in the Department of Rural Development in New Delhi. The court accepted the CBI’s closure report in the matter and quashed the proceedings.
The case dates back to 2016 when an FIR was registered following a preliminary inquiry into the alleged illegal renewal of 13 sand mining leases in Saharanpur. After investigating, the CBI filed a closure report stating that the allegations against Kumar could not be substantiated and that no material indicating criminal conspiracy, cheating, or abuse of official position had been found against him.
However, the special judge refused to accept the closure report and directed the CBI to obtain sanction for prosecuting Kumar under the Prevention of Corruption Act. Kumar then moved the high court, arguing that he had merely acted in discharge of his official duties and had no role in making any recommendations or approvals regarding the renewal of the mining leases.
The high court observed that the trial court’s direction to secure prosecution sanction was against the law and that Kumar’s petition under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) was maintainable. The court also noted that the government alone was the competent authority to decide on the issue of renewal, and that no second renewal lease deed was ever executed due to an interim order passed by the high court.
